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In the last few decades Western political analysts and policy-makers have
become increasingly concerned with the role of force and power m  the 
international arena Concepts such as superpower and middle-range power 
have been created to categorize the relative power position of states, and 
academic journals are filled with attempts to define operationalize and measure 
such terms as power, force, and influence Numerous studies have been 
carried out to determine whether power — defined in terms of economic 
political or military capacity— yields influence which is usually viewed as 
the ability to bring about a desired change in the behavior of another state 
Other studeis have focused on the political uses of force It is interesting to 
note that these academic exercise have occurred m  virtual ignorance of the work 
being done by Soviet academics on related issues
One of the centerpieces of Soviet international relations theory is the 
doctrine of the correlation of forces which refers to the military economic 
political, and moral factors that determine the course of history In 
Marxist-Leninist thought history consists of the playing out of the 
contradictions which exist m  the world During the current stage of history 
the central contradiction or conflict, is that between the socialist camp led 
by the Soviet Union and the capitalist camp which is dominated by the United 
States The correlation of forces is not restricted to the intrinsic attributes 
of the two campus but also includes an assessment of other obiective and 
subiective factors m  the international system For example international 
movements and multinational corporations are also seen as actors which play 
critical roles within the correlation of forces For Soviet theorists it is the 
correlation of forces which determines the outcome of all struggles, in times of 
both peace and war ^
The purpose of the present paper will be to examine the meaning of the
2concept of correlation of forces as it has been developed by Soviet political 
leaders and academic analysts In addition however we are especially 
concerned with the relevance of the doctrine to an understanding of Soviet 
policy toward Western Europe A study of the doctrine of the correlation of 
forces is valuable for a further understanding of Soviet international strategy 
for several reasons First it puts forth a number of propositions about the 
nature of the international system which might be be empirically tested as a 
possible alternative theoretical framework for understanding international 
relations Second and more relevant to an understanding of the foundations of 
Soviet international behavior, correlation of forces is the conceptual tool 
employed by Soviet leaders and theoreticians to guide and explain the foreign 
policy of the Soviet state  ^ Thus a better understanding of the concept may 
well provide insights into Soviet foreign policy itself
I The Correlation of Forces
The concept of a correlation of forces is not unique to the Soviet 
understanding of international relations In fact the doctrine is derived from 
the notion that all conflict evolves into polzanzed struggle which was 
developed by Karl Marx and elaborated by V I Lenin As Judson Mitchell notes, 
m  their views historical developments tend to reduce all social conflicts to a 
zero-sum struggle between two distinct groups 3 The outcome of any particular 
struggle is determined by the relative economic progressiveness of the 
combatants, for progressive classes always win  ^ The correlation of forces 
refers to the struggle of classes m  individual countries and on the 
international arena  ^ Technically Soviet theorists have never developed a 
theory of international relations per se for they do not acknowledge the
3legitimate lasting existence of the state  ^ But for all practical purposes 
the correlation of forces can be seen as a Soviet equivalent of a theory of 
international relations
The doctrine was transposed onto the internatioinal arena in 1921 when 
Lenin discussed the predicament of a still young and besieged Soviet state He 
argued
When we calmly weigh the sympathy felt for Bolshevism and the 
socialist revolution when we survey the international situation 
from the point of view of the balance of forces while being
S' ^immeasurably weaker economically politically and militarilv than
the other powers, we are at the sane time stronger ^
In the rest of this speech Lenin explained tha this strength derived from their 
reliance on Marxist theory which enables Soviet leaders to assess correctly 
and thereby to exploit the contradictions within the imperialist camp As the 
Soviet academic Sanakoyev interprets this point the Soviet Union is morally
Qstronger than its capitalist competitors °
Typically Soviet analysts divide the correlation of forces into four maior 
categories C Shakhnazarov, for example, identifies these components as 
economic, military, and political factors, as well as international political 
movements  ^ In Sanakoyev's work military, economic, political moral and 
other forces are included m  the correlation of forces ^  Civen the 
Marxist-I enmist nature of this doctrine one might expect that preeminent 
weight would be given to economic forces historically, however this has not 
alwasy been true
Michael J Deane has argued quite convincingly that the relative weighting 
of the elements within the correlation of forces has changed along with the 
changes in Soviet leadership H  The dominant ideological theme under Stalin was 
the evolution of the two-camp theory which foresaw an inevitable war between
4the socialist and capitalist camps To prepare for this war Stalin emphasized 
the need to build up Soviet military and economic might as rapidly as possible
With Khrushchev's ascension to power cane the development of the doctrine 
of peaceful coexistence, in which war vas no longer seen as inevitable Thus 
military factors were asigned a secondary, but nonetheless important, place 
within the correlation of forces In Khrushchev's view economic factors were to 
play a preeminent role within the correlation of forces and subsequently he 
sought to redirect at least some Soviet investment funds from the military to 
the civilian economic sector Khrushchev also saw the Third World as an 
important arena for East-West competition therefore new significance was 
placed on international political movements— particularly on the non-aligned 
movement ^
According to Deane the Brezhnev leadership sought to broaden the front of 
systemic competition ^  Economic factors retained their preeminent place in 
Soviet views of the correlation of forces but greater efforts were made in 
other areas of competition as well— e g in the ideological and military arenas 
By the latter half of the 1970s, however the leadership emphasized more and 
more the importance of the military component m  the pursuit of Soviet foreign 
policy obiectives Although the prediction of trends in the Soviet assessment 
of the correlation of forces can be little more than guesswork continuing high 
levels of hostility in Soviet-U S relations could mean further strengthening of 
the place assigned to military factors in the correlation of forces
Deane also notes that Soviet analysts commonly identify three historic 
shifts within the correlation of forces ^  The first shift occurred m  1917 
with the creation of the world's first communist state The second was marked 
by the defeat of fascism in 1945 and the spread of communism to Eastern Europe
5and Asia in the ensuing years The most recent modification occurred m  at the 
beginning of the 1970s with the USSR’s attainment of strategic parity with the 
United States In the view of Soviet analysts parity forced the United States 
to abandon its concentration on military force and to enter into strategic 
negotiations with the Soviet Union thus ushering in the era of detente ^  It 
is important to note that military, rather than economic or political factors 
play the critical role in all three events identified by the Soviets as manor 
shifts m  the correlation of forces
Although similar in some respects the doctrine of correlation of forces 
differs significantly from standard Western methods of assessing capabilities 
In an article that appeared m  the Soviet Tournai, International Affairs
Sanakoyev compares the correlation of forces with the Western concept of balance 
of power ^  In bis view the balance of power theory suffers from two 
important fl^ws which do not characterize the doctrine of the correlation of 
forces First it ignores the inevitability of change and assumes a degree of 
stability in the international system that is unrealistic Secondly, Sanakoyev 
maiantains that the balance of power theory ignores the importance m  
international affairs of factors other than force The correlation of forces 
model, he argues, does not overemphasize the role of force in international 
affairs rather it contends that victory will go to the side favored by the 
overall balance ^
However this explicit denial of the dominant role of brute force which 
is embedded m  Soviet theory stands m  stark contrast to actual Soviet behavior 
and to the persistent Soviet military buildup On this point Seweryn Bialer has 
commented Soviet writings on the role and use of military power in 
international affairs initially overwhelm the reader with the feeling of
6unreality especially when they are compared with Soviet actions ^  The only 
resolution of this apparent paradox is the fact that, m  the Soviet view 
military force is a manor but not preeminent determinant of the correlation 
and one m  which the Soviets excel Thus the Soviet buildup changes the 
correlation of forces As Deane explains, Communism can attain its inevitable 
victory1 even withou war because the correlation of forces is shifting in its 
favor
A major weakness of the doctrine of the correlation of forces stems from 
the fact that it tends to recognize only uni-directional shifts m  force It 
cannot recognize or subseauently explain the setbacks and failures of 
communism— except by arguing that earlier assessments concerning ♦‘he state of 
the balance were incorrect Although setbacks are often discussed and analyzed 
in great detail, this discussion usually occurs outside the context of the 
theory of the correlation of forces Obviously the doctrine is useless m  the 
analysis of a number of manor international events For example how can one 
adequately explain the Sino-Soviet split without acknowledging a manor setback 
for the socialist camp It seems, therefore that the ideological components of 
the correlation of forces doctrine would significantly impair its utility as an 
analytical tool
How Soviet analysts actually calculate the correlation of forces is 
unclear As noted above there are four manor components of the 
correlation— economic, military and political factors and international 
movements)— and the relative importance of these components seems to vary over 
time Obviously, the total correlation includes qualitative as well as 
quantitative factors therefore the total assessment can be only a rough 
approximation 20 As Deane argues the global correlation seems to constitute
7an intuitive calculation of forces based on the Soviet leadership’s feel for the 
direction of world events 21 Certainly this type of assessment does not 
automatically translate into particular foreign policy strategies However, a 
clear understanding of the global correlation of forces would provide the Soviet 
leadership with a heightened awareness of areas of Soviet weaknecs vis-â-vis 
the West Unlike their American counterparts Soviet leaders have not suddenly 
discovered gaps in their forces which later turned out to be illusiary 
Instead Soviet leaders have generally focused on the long-term strengthening of 
areas of relative Soviet weakness
Also, since the correlation of forces is seen as the déterminent of the 
outcome of international struggle m  times of peace, as well as during war 
detente for the Soviet Union did not entail a lessened need to rectify Soviet 
weaknesses in relationship to the United States Detente did not imply an end 
to struggle but rather a new form of struggle
This argument helps further to resolve the apparent paradox noted above 
Because war between the two camps is no longer viewed as inevitable military 
factors do not play an independent role, but must be viewed as merely a part of 
the larger correlation of forces 22 The Soviet military buildup changes the 
correlation which m  turn effects world events Therefore, victories can be 
won without the use of force although the availability of military power is 
critical to those victories 23
Historically, the Soviets have made use of the correlation of forces on two 
levels It is used m  a global sense to assess the general struggle between
the socialist and capitalist camps It is on this level that we have so far 
discussed the doctrine However, the doctrine is also used to analyze events in 
a particular region of the world or in a particular struggle It is on this
/
8narrower level that the correlation of forces will be examined m  the remainder 
of this paper, with particular reference to the United States and Western 
Europe
II The Correlation of Forces between the United States and the Soviet Union
Despite the rapid economic growth of the EEC countries and Japan during the 
past quarter of a century and the emergence of the People's Republic of China as 
a nuclear power, the world of the mid-1980s remains essentially bi-polar 
Soviet perceptions and policies have persistently reflected this reality No 
single state or even region is as much a focus of Soviet foreign policy as is 
the United States Soviet leaders as their American counterparts often see 
conflicts throughout the world primarily m  light of the U S -Soviet struggle 
Thus, within the world correlation of forces, which matches the socialist camp 
against the capitalist, the most critical component is certainly the U S -Soviet 
correlation of forces When Western analysts compare U S and Soviet forces, 
they usually discuss primarily military factors Here, m  keeping with Soviet 
usage m  examining the correlation of forces we shall examine military
? seconomic and political-psychological factors in the U S -Soviet correlation
A The Military Dimension of Soviet Policy
In the immediate postward period the American monopoly on atomic weapons 
left the Soviet Union m  a vulnerable position Yet, the USSR was not entirely 
without a deterrent to possible U S attack The rapid U S demobilization 
immediately after the cessation of hostilities resulted in an expansion of 
Soviet superiority in conventional military forces in Europe As Mark Miller 
has noted The core of the Soviet deterrent m  the early postwar years was the
9ability of the Red Army to overrun Western Europe 26 The ability of the United 
States to utilize fully its atomic monopoly was also questionable First the 
short range of the bombers required access to forward bases around the periphery 
of the Soviet Union moreover the U S stockpile of atomic weapons was 
extremely small 27 The Soviet position worsened considerably immediately after 
the Korean War despite the fact that m  the meantime the USSR had developed 
nuclear weapons of its own for the war m  Korea had stimulated ma-jor rearmament 
in the West Particularly important was the accelerated producetion of the B-2 
bomber in the United States and the development of the hydrogen bomb 2^
The USSR’s reaction to the U S nuclear monopoly developed fully only after 
the death of Stalin m  1953 In the following years a new consensus developed 
in the Soviet weapons procurement program which continues until today the 
Soviet Union has striven unceasingly to equal if not surpass the military 
might of the United States, particularly m  the realm of nucelar weaponry 
Under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev the Soviet Union exploded its first 
hydrogen bomb m  1953 by 1957 it had attained the ability to launch IfBMs The 
importance of nuclear forces was clearly demonstrated in May of 1960, when the 
newly—created strategic Missile Forces were elevated to the status of a separate 
military service In fact it soon was accorded primacy over all other branches 
of the Soviet military 29 One reason for Khrushchev’s strong support for a 
policy of peaceful coexistence was the need to calm U S fears of Soviet 
expansionism This, in turn was expected to slow the pace of the U S military 
buildup after the Korean War and to give the Soviet Union some hope of obtaining 
strategic parity with the United States Parity however was not attainable 
during the tenure of Nikita Khrushchev even though the Soviets were able to 
mitigate some of the effects of this strategic disparity by their more than
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tacit perpetuation of the myth of an American missile gap at the beginning of 
the 1960s
Ironically, Khrushchev’s eagerness to attain nuclear parity may have 
contributed to his eventual removal from power Khrushchev’s rationale for 
placing missiles in Cuba m  1962 was the argument that the missiles were needed 
to deter another American attack on Cuba similar to the aborted Bay of Pigs 
invasion of 1961 ^0 However whatever importance Cuba then held for the Soviet 
Union it could hardly counter the high risks incurred in the attempt to place 
Soviet missiles in that island country Furthermore a U S invasion of Cuba 
could probably have been deterred with less expense and less risk through 
conventional means Amore plausible explanation of Khrushchev's motives, 
suggested by Grahan Allison is the fact that Khrushchev questioned the resolve 
of the new U S president and hoped to counter U S strategic superiority by the
emplacement of Soviet missiles less than one hundred miles from U S 
1territory
If the United States had failed to notice or react to the Cuban missiles 
before they became operational, almost all ma-jor U S cities would be have been 
vulnerable to Soviet attack By 1962 President Kennedy had discovered that m  
fact, the United States retained nuclear superiority particularly in the area 
of delivery systems The Soviet IRBMs (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missieles) 
and MRBMs (Medium Range Ballistic Missiles) which were situated on Soviet 
territory were incapable of reaching targets inside the United States Thus 
with the myth of the missile gab dissolved, the USSR again feared the 
possibility of II S nuclear blackmail Soviet missiles m  Cuba would have been 
capable of hitting most manor U S cities with a substantial degree of accuracy 
moreover, because of the proximity to U S targets of Soviet missiles based in
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Cuba U S reaction time to a Soviet first strike would have been dramatically 
reduced Had the initial seventy-two Soviet missiles become functional the 
Soviets would then have been in the position to further tilt the correlation of 
military forces in their own favor by adding more missiles at a later time 3  ^
Although the Soviet Union was unable to achieve strategic nuclear parity 
with the United States during Khrushchev’s leadership the commitment to 
accomplish that goal was reaffirmed during the first year’s of the collective 
leadership headed by Brezhnev The approach taken, however was new Rather 
than repeating Khrushchev’s erratic challenges and dangerous attempts to attain 
parity virtually overnight Brezhnev pursued an extensive yet steady arms 
buildup The success of that program was clear, for by the early 1970s the 
Soviet Union had not only deaveloped the ability to deliver its weapons to U S 
targets but also had more ICBMs than the United States The Soviet United 
continued to lag behind m  SLBMs (Submarine-launched ballistic missiles) and m  
long-range bombers, but a position of approximate parity had been achieved
Almost immediately President Nixon publicly acknowledged the fact that the 
Soviets had achieved parity— a fact that was formally recognized by the U S m  
the signing of the first strategic arms limitation treaty m  1972 33
Throughout the 1970s Soviet nuclear arms procurement continued at a rate 
considerably faster than that of the United States and by the late 1970s the 
Soviet arsenal was at least quantitatively superior However much of this 
numerical superiority resulted from the fact that the Soviets unlike their U S 
counterparts, did not routinely retire their outdated missile systems In 
addition, the technological superiority of U S systems at least partially 
compensated for Soviet numerical superiority in the number of delivery systems 
A comparison of Soviet and U S conventional capabilities is much more
1 2
clearcut from manpower to tanks the Soviet Union has persistently maintained 
overwhelming numerical military superiority Soviet military strategists did 
not assume that the development of nuclear weapons lessened the utility of 
conventional weaponry Khrushchev had argued that an increase m  nuclear 
firepower would permit a reduction of Soviet manpower ^4 This contention 
however was never accepted by the miliary or by the rest of the Politburo 
Under Brezhnev’s leadership, the USSR continued to stress the preemince of 
nuclear force, but instead of making conventional weapons obsolete the nuclear 
statemate with the U S that ensued m  effect opened up an entire range of 
situations in which conventional weapons might prove to be critical
First, as developments m  U S -Soviet relations during the past three 
decades have shown, the destructive power of nuclear weapons is so great that 
neither of the two superpowers has been willing to run the risks of their use m  
conflict situations The dangers inherent in escalating superpower conflicts 
has to date proven too be to great for either superpower Conventional forces 
however have been utilized on numerous occastions by both the United States and 
the Soviet Union, with little fear of direct nuclear confrontation Thus 
conventional military power has continued to play an important role in the 
global competition between the two superpowers
In addition the Soviet nuclear war strategy assigns a critical role to 
conventional weapons Major General Talensky, for example noted the following 
points First nuclear war is possible, but not inevitable second, if a 
nuclear war were to occur it should be fought to achieve victory third 
correct preparation and strategies make victory in nuclear war a possibility 
and, finally, adherence to a doctrine of mutually assured destruction would 
deprive the USSR of conventional forces of political and military utility and
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would give the United States a free hand in the conduct of limited wars Thus, 
for the Soviet Union conventional military strength continues to play a positive 
role within the correlation of forces 35
At this -juncture it is worth recalling that, in the Soviet view the 
correlation of forces is a continuously operative law of history Military 
force, therefore, can determine outcomes even when not employed That is 
military force can be used for political ends For example the mere presence 
of massive military force along the borders of Finland has played a role m  
influencing that country's pursuit of a policy of neutrality As we shall 
discuss m  more detail later m  this paper, one of the goals of the buildup of 
Soviet military power in Europe has been to change the political-psychological 
component of the correlation of forces in Western Europe To a lesser extent 
Soviet leaders also hope to use the strength of their military to stimulate the 
growth of pacifist tendencies in the United States itself Soviet leaders are 
aware of the fact that they were able to attain nuclear parity and conventiomal 
military superiority in large part because of domestic developments m  the 
United States including political-psychological factors, that resulted m  
lapses in U S military procurement
B The Political Dimension of Soviet Foreign Policy
In the official Soviet view the political-psychological superiority of the 
Soviet system stems from its adherence to the principles of Marxism-Leninism 
Socialism is viewed as a more equitable system than capitalism and, thus 
attracts world—wide appeal and support On a more practical level Soviet 
ideology has provided the Soviet Union with a constancy of purpose unknown 
anywhere in the West Soviet policy initiatives are not reexamined and reversed
IA
every four years nor is there evidence of substantial conflict in foreign
policy priorities among the various departments of the Soviet government Thus,
the leaders of the Soviet Union face fewer impediments to the implementation of 
their foreign policy initiatives than do their U S counterparts This is not
to argue that Soviet foreign-policy decision-making is fully consensual for it
is not Divisions exist within the Soviet elite and as Alexander Dallin has
noted one aspect of the distinction between the Soviet left and right
concerns the identifiably different assessments of the correlation of forces 36
But the foreign policy which enmates from Moscow whether the result of
consensus or of compromise, clearly has not been sublet to the same degree of
fluctuation as has U S policy
Moreover, m  addition to the political factors which are seen by the 
Soviets as favoring the Soviet Union, the correlation of forces is progressively 
favoring the socialist camp because of the relatively great number of structural 
weaknesses within the capitalist camp 3  ^ The most obvious of these relates to 
the divisions among the states making up the capitalist camp In recent years 
the Soviet leadership has attaempted to utilize the existing differences of 
perspective on security policy between the United States and some of its 
european allies to slow the modernization of NATO military capabilities
According to Sanokoyev, the real strength of the Soviet Union is derived 
from its leadership's understanding of Marxism-Leninism and thus the 
historical class struggle that is currently unfolding 38 In other words the 
U S leadership fails to understand either the extent or the nature of the 
Soviet challenge
There has been a tendency among Americans to see the Soviet threat strictly 
m  military terms U S policy— from containment to the Reagan policy of
15
rearmament and peace through strength— has been based primarily on a concern
for military preparedness to respond to possible Soviet aggression However
Soviet leaders and analysts are quite explicit in noting the role that
non-military factors play m  the historical struggle between the two world
systems In the words of Sanokoyev
speaking of the correlation of forces in the world, we refer, 
above all to the correlation of the class forces and the 
struggle of classes both m  individual countries and on the 
international arena taking into account the real 
forces— economic, political moral and others— which stand behind 
these classes Defining the real forces m  international 
relations, bourgeois scientists as a rule concentrate attention 
on military and economic factors
Sanakoyev admits that economic and military factors are of tremendous
importance because they form the material basis of the class struggle ^0 Yet,
moral (political-psychological) factors are also explicitly mentioned In many
respects the East-West struggle is one of ideologies as well as one between the
interests of states Thus, one of the primary purposes of Soviet propaganda is
to exploit what the Soviet leadership views as the moral weaknesses of the
United States and the West in general Throughout the Third World Soviet
propaganda activities are meant to aggrevate and focus real problems that exist
in relations between the developing countries and the countries of the West
The purpose of these activities is not merely to worsen the West s relationships
with the developing world, but also to create a sense of cooperation and thus
closer ties between the Soviet Union and numerous Third World states As
Anatoly Gromyko, head of the African Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences
and son of the Soviet foreign minister explains
The USSR and Africa's independent countries are closely cooperating to 
eliminate thevestiges of racism and colonialism and fight against 
neo-colonialism, and that brings notable rtesults and promotes closer 
relations between this country and the young African states ^
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In a similar manner the Soviets have attempted over the course of the 
years to influence domestic political developments m  the United States For 
example, the Soviet peace initiative that began m  the late 1960s and 
culminated m  the policy of detente had a number of objective— not the least 
important of which was the gaming of access to Western technology considered 
critical to dealing with the serious problems that faced the Soviet
/  O
economy The Soviet policy of normalization of relations with the West and 
the concurrent downplaying of overt hostility toward the United States and its 
ma-|or allies, also helped to reduce Western fears of the Soviet Union and 
subsequently to slow the U S armaments buildup In recent years the Soviets 
have reiuvenated their peace campaign m  an attempt to blunt U S efforts 
initiated aleady m  the Carter Administration to rebuild U S and NATO 
military capabilities The most important aspect of this campaign has been 
the attempt to support opposition m  both the United States and Western Europe 
to the emplacement of both cruise and Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles
C The Economic Dimension of Soviet Foreign Policy
As previously noted, one would expect any doctrine based on Marxism to 
place paramount exphasis on economic forces But the doctrine of the 
correlation of forces does not assign preeminent importance to economic 
factors This is probably attributable to the fact that the economic 
component of the correlation of forces is the one category m  which the Soviet 
Union has consistently lagged far behind the United States Despite 
Khrushchev's boasts in the late 1950s and early 1960s about the USSR's 
catching and surpassing the United States in total production of goods, the
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Soviet Union still lags far behind its major capitalist competitor m  most 
important areas especially in those based on modern technology Moreover 
Soviet growth rates have fallen off substantially during the course of the 
past decade and the USSR actually faces the prospect of Japan's replacing it 
as the second largest economy sometime during the course of the 1990s
Detente and the Soviet effort to import contemporarv industrial 
technology from the West was the boldest Soviet initiative to date to deal 
Wlth the problems still facing the Soviet economy The Soviet leadership 
expected that with a major infusion of Western technology and capital the 
Soviet Union and its East European allies would be able to produce high-grade 
products and market them in the West This expectation has largely proven to 
be unfounded, as the extensive hard currency debts built up by several 
communist states indicate
Today the Soviet economy and the economies of its East European allies 
are beset with numerous serious problems As a result of detente the ties 
between East and West have increased and subsequently, so has economic 
interdependence To a degree even the Soviet Union depends on access to 
Western technology and food products ( m  particular for feed grains) It 
would now be difficult if not impossible for the Soviets return to the 
autarky of the 1950s Contact with the West during the past decade also 
stimulated a latent consumerism in the Soviet Union Although the Soviet 
standard of living has risen steadily until quite recently, it has not kept 
pace with rising demand and expectations The resolution of these and other 
problems demands the type of far-reaching economic reform which is most feared 
by the Kremlin leadership
A related problem concerns the high price that the Soviets must pay to
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maintain superpower status After Castro’s victory in 1959 for example they 
began subsidizing the Cuban economy at about $400 million per year That cost 
has soared to approximately $3 billion a year 43 The Soviets’ newfound 
friends m  Vietnam and Ethiopia each receive an estimated $150-450 million per 
year m  economic aid alone 44 Thus there is growing doubt whether the Soviet 
Union can expand let alone maintain its global economic commitments In 
addition the Soviet image in the Third World has been significantly tarnished 
by the invasion of Afghanistan, and demands for more economic aid from the 
USSR have grown stronger The Soviet Union however, has neither the will not 
the ability to compete with Western economic assistance Even more 
problematic for the Soviet Union is the maintenance of stability in communist 
Eastern Europe In the words of Paul Marer, already by the mid-1970s Eastern 
Europe had become an increasingly large economic liability 45 By 1980 it was 
estimated that economic and military loans and subsidies to Eastern Europe 
totalled over $20 billion 46
The weakness of the Soviet economy within the correlation of forces is 
itself a major concern for Soviet leaders Just as important however, is the 
impact of economic inferiority on the ability of the Soviets to fulfill their 
perceived military needs However, as Marshall Coldman points out, no 
economic system is better structured to cater to the requirements of a 
military establishment than is the Soviet planned economy 47 In the past the 
military’s privileged position in questions of resource allocation has allowed 
it to meet its needs and, in the 1970s at least, to exceed U S military 
expenditures Moreover, since most Western analysts are convinced that the 
productivity of the arms production industries far surpasses that of the 
consumer sectors of the economy, the expenditures have resulted in a
19
substantial increase in overall Soviet military capabilities Finally, durine; 
the recent leadership transitions the bargaining power of the 
military-security coalition has increased considerably in the view of many 
Western analysts Thus, despite the weaknesses of the Soviet economy it 
appears likely that the needs of the Soviet military will continue to be met 
throughout the remainder of the decade
However the requirements of the Soviet military put a tremendous strain 
on a troubled economy Because of differences m  national accounting it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to compare accurately U S and Soviet military 
spending Yet it is clear that to maintain pace with the United States the 
Soviets must spend a much larger percentage of the smaller Soviet GNP 
Western estimates of Soviet defense expenditures commonly range from ten to 
sixteen percent of GNP U S  defense expenditures in recent years have 
consumed less than ten percent of CNP In 1981 one Soviet economist warned 
that
an excessive increase in military economic might cannot be allowed 
because m  the final analysis this could slow the development of the very 
foundation of military power— the economy— and do irreparable harm to 
defense capability 49
The burden that the military places on the Soviet economy is undeniable 
yet the Soviet population remains passive enough that it would be an 
unwarranted exaggeration to speak of a Soviet debate on guns versus 
buttear Of the resources available m  the Soviet economy, the military will 
certainly continue to get its share (at least in the range of 3-4 percent 
annual increases) despite some evidence of rising consumerism Although 
the Soviet economy is beset with numerous problems it does continue to grow 
albeit at a significantly reduced rate than m  the past Thus there is no
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foreseeable reason that the Sovxet leadershrp „ríl not be able to narntain or 
even increase its present level of military expenditures
It is the Soviet economy which represents the weakest link for the Soviet 
Union in the international correlation of forces The Soviet economy cannot 
beein to match the enormous potential of the U S economy Furthermore when 
West European and Japanese economic potential is added to that of the United 
States the economic capabilities of the entire Soviet-oriented communist 
world are dwarfed This runs directly contrary to the Soviet claim that 
communism is a more productive as well as more equitable economic system 
The substantial economic potential of the Soviet Union is unquestionable 
Although its agricultural lands cannot match those of the United States its 
diversity and abundance of mineral resources surpass those of the United 
States However the full development and utilization of these resources 
depends on access to Western technology and capital as well as on increased 
Soviet productivity But the flow of Western technology is dependent on 
friendly relations with the countries of the West and also brings with it the 
likelihood of economic dependence on— or at least interdependence with— the 
West In addition to increase productivity new incentives, as well as 
liberalization and decentralization of the economy are probably imperative 
These will entail the loss of central control, which the present, conservative 
Soviet leadership is unlikely to risk Thus in the near future the Soviet 
economy, will most likely remain the most significant weakness for the Soviet 
Union in the correlation of forces
In summary from the Soviet perspective the changes in the U S -Soviet 
correlation of forces over the course of the past three decades have been 
largely favorable— at least up until about 1980 By the early 1970s the USSR
2 1
had achieved its goal of nuclear parity and currently although Soviet 
nuclear forces nay be technologically inferior to those of the United States, 
the USSS has more missiles and megatons of destructive capacity than does the 
United States In the area of conventional weapons the Soviet Union continues 
to maintain a substantial lead, in particular in Europe
Political-psychological factors appear to continue to favor the Soviet Union 
although recent developments in the Third World would indicate that the 
Soviets have lost some of their advantages m  that part of the world 
However, the Soviet position vis-â-vis the United States is far from secure 
Its economic system is crippled with serious deficiencies, and increases m  
productivity lag increasingly far behind those of the United States and Japan 
Moreover, recent shifts in attitudes within the United States have resulted m  
a substantial increase m  commitment to refurbishing U S military 
capabilities As Soviet leaders and political commentators have noted since 
approximately 1980, the Reagan Administration has committed itself to 
reversing the military trends of the past two decades or so From the Soviet 
perspective this represents a direct challenge to the one area within the 
correlation of forces m  which the Soviets have made the most significant 
gams Although no authoritative statements have appeared that refer to the 
possibility of a reversal of the international trend in the correlation such 
a possibility is clearly implied in many Soviet writings ^0
H I  Western Furope and the Correlation of Forces
To a very substantial degree Soviet policy toward the countries of 
Western Europe can be viewed as a function of the Soviet-American 
relationship Throughout the past three decades the Soviets have measured
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their relations with countries such as France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany in large part by the degree to which those countries pursue policies 
congruent with or different fron the policies of the United States This is 
not to argue that other factors specific to bilateral relations with Western 
Europe do not play a role m  influencing Soviet policy It means, rather 
that the Soviets view Western Europe as an integral part of the capitalist 
alliance system which is headed by the United States and thus, as an 
extremely important component of the forces arrayed against it Furope both 
East and West has remained over the course of the four decades since the 
conclusion of the Second World War the world region of greatest significance 
for Soviet security interests It is in Eastern Europe that the Soviets have 
succeeded m  extending most completely their own domination while m  Western 
Europe they face the mai or concentration of NATO’s military power
Although the specifics of Soviet policy toward Western Europe have been 
modified over time, several long-term goals have remained constant The first 
of these concerns the continuing Soviet effort to strengthen its own military 
position in relationship to the Western alliance system Attempts to 
accomplish this goal ranpe from renovating and expanding the military 
capabilities of the Warsaw Pact as has occurred over the course of the last 
decade to political-propaganda campaigns aimed at dividing members of the 
NATO alliance or at preventing the expansion of NATO’s military capabilities 
The major peace offensive launched in opposition to the emplacement of 
Cruise and Pershing II intermediate-range missiles is a recent example of such 
an attempt
A second, and closely related Soviet goal in Europe concernes Soviet 
opposition to the strengthening of West European integration Although
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reality has forced the Soviets in recent years to grant de facto recognition 
to the existence of the European Communities, the Soviet leadership has 
strongly opposed West European unification, most likely because of a concern 
that a unified Western Europe closely allied with the United States would 
reduce the possibilities for the Soviets to bring pressure to bear against 
individual countries and to continue to try to take advantage of differences 
dividing members of the Western alliance
A third set of Soviet goals has concerned Eastern Europe Until the 
early 1970s the Soviets devoted substantial efforts to gaming from the West 
recognition of the status quo m  Eastern Europe— including the postwar 
territorial boundaries, the existence of communist political systems, and also 
the dominant Soviet position in the region With the signing of the Helsinki 
accords in 1974 these goals were largely achieved However the Soviets are
concerned with the attraction that the West exercises on the populations 
of Eastern Europe Events in Poland since 1Q80 and the more recent Soviet 
pressures against the German Democratic Republic to cancel a scheduled meeting 
in West Germany present examples of the continuing Soviet fear of the possible 
erosion of their dominance in Eastern Europe
Since at least the beginning of the 1970s significant economic goals have 
assumed an importance m  Soviet policy much greater that they had earlier had 
The moribund state of Soviet technological development and an ingrained fear 
of running the risks inherent m  substantial economic reform and 
decentralization led the Soviets to pursue an economic strategy based on 
expanded trade with the West The purpose of this trade has been, in large 
part, to gain access to modern technology with which to improve the 
performance of the Soviet economy Even though the they are now less sanguine
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about the likely success of this policy Soviet leaders are still comr.itted to 
attempts to modernize their economy by Importing Western technology
In line with their views of the comprehensive nature of the correlation of 
forces the Soviets— much more than their Western competitors— make serious 
efforts to develop an approach to their foreign policy m  which political
military, economic, ideological and cultural elements are joined in a 
comprehensive whole In the remainder of this analysis we shall attempt to 
examine, albeit quite briefly the various aspects of Soviet policy toward 
Western Europe in the recent past The purpose of this examination will be to 
determine the ways in which the Soviet leadership has attempted to accomplish 
the goals outlined above and the place that Western Europe holds in the Soviet 
view of the international correlation of forces
A The Military Dimension of Soviet Policy m  Europe
Over the course of the past three decades the Soviets and their Warsaw 
Pact allies have continued to expand and modernize their military capabilities 
so that by the caddie of the 1980s there is no doubt that the Warsaw Pact 
en-|oys significant military superiority in the area of conventional weapons 
and superiority m  theater nuclear weapons as well Between 1965 and 1980 
for example, overall force ratios between the WTO and NATO increased from 
1 5 1 to 2 0 1 for manor equipment such as main battle tanks artillery, and 
anti-tank suns the ratio reached more than 2 5 1 in favor of the WTO 51 Slnce 
the late 1960s the Soviets have not only continued to expand the total number 
of the manor conventional weapon systems devoted to the European theater they 
have also introduced advanced techological systems into their deployed 
armaments For example, they have replaced older anti-aircraft weapons with
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modern surface-to-air missiles and with sophisticated self-propelled guns that 
are far more efficient than their predecessors More than 8,000 third- and 
fourth- generation ma m  battle tanks superior to most of the equipment m  the 
Western arsenal, were added to the older tanks— only half of which were 
withdrawn fron service 2^
The expansion and modernization of conventional weaponry within the WTO 
occurred largely independent of developments within NATO, for no comparable 
modernization drive occurred m  the West during the 1970s However, as 
Phillip Karber has argued the WTO states appear to have aimed at 
mirror-imaging the organizational structure of NATO In the mid-1960s NATO 
divisions were stronger in manpower and armament than even the strongest WTO 
divisions, although the WTO comprised substantially more divisions The 
Soviets and their allies increased and modernized the weaponry available to 
each division and by the beginning of the 1980s the modernization drive 
resulted in divisions that, with few exceptions, were substantially stronger 
m  conventional weaponry than were most NATO divisions
In addition to the significant increase m  conventional armaments 
available to the Warsaw Pact by the 1980s, the Soviets also introduced an 
entire new generation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, beginning in 
the mid-1970s The SS-20 mobile MIRVed IRBM provides significant improvements 
m  survivability, range accuracy and number of warheads m  comparison with 
the SS-4 and SS—5 missiles that they have supplemented or replaced The 
Soviet decision to deploy these new intermediate-range missiles has, in 
effect resulted m  a manor shift in relative nuclear capabilities within the 
European theater By 1985, for example, the Warsaw Pact possesses 
approximately 5 700 TNF delivery vehicles (with about 8,000 warhads) m
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comparison with 2 600 NATO delivery vehicles (and 5,500 nuclear warheads) 53 
Closely associated with the actual buildup of Soviet military power m  
Europe have been the various campaigns mounted by the Soviet leadership to 
forestall the modernization of NATO military capabilities At the time that
the United States was considering the introduction of the B-l bomber and the 
neutron bomb for example the Soviets mounted ma-jor propaganda campaigns
targeted m  large part on the citizens of Western Europe and the United 
States Although there is virtually no evidence to support the argument that 
the Soviets were instrumental m  the creation of various peace movements 
active m  the West, they clearly have been interested in supporting these 
movements and m  providing them with verbal ammunition 5A
After the NATO decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing II missiles in 
response to the earlier Soviet deployment of SS-20s Brezhnev and other Soviet 
leaders made clear efforts to divide the members of the Western alliance on 
the entire issue of security in Europe and the implications of the NATO 
missile deployment 55 They argued that the deployment of U S 
intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe represented an attempt by NATO 
to shift the balance of military capabilities m  Europe m  favor of the West 
Gerhard Wettig has argued that Soviet intransigence m  the negotiations on 
intermediate-range missiles and the decision to rely heavily on a propaganda 
campaign against the deployment of the NATO missiles resulted from their 
assessment of the role that pressure and propaganda had played in bringing 
about a U S decision not to go ahead with the production and deployment of 
the neutron bomb However political conditions in the West were different 
by the early 1980s— especially in the United States Moreover despite the 
ability of opponents of missile deployment to bring out thousands of
27
supporters for demonstrations in West Germany Great Britain, and even the 
United States, the decision to go ahead with deployment was never reversed
Another aspect of Soviet policy toward Europe has been the attempt to 
gain U S agreement to exclude direct West European security interests from 
various discussions on arms control or limitation The Soviet insistence for 
example that both French and British nuclear weapons be included in Western 
calculations of NATO nuclear strength has been aimed in effect, at ignoring 
the legitimate separate security interests of Western Europe On the other 
hand, Soviet leaders have also attempted to convince the Europeans that the 
latters* security interests diverge from those of the United States and that 
Soviet and West European interests overlap and differences between them could
be worked out if only Western Europe could reduce its dependence on the United 
States
Despite the fact that the Soviets have managed to establish overall 
military superiority m  Europe this does not mean that the Soviet leadership 
is likely to initiate military operations in Europe First of all the Warsaw 
Pact s military advantage is not large enough to ensure military victory m  
particular when one takes into account the global military balance between the 
USSR and the United States Secondly, the buildup of Soviet military 
capacities m  Furope over the course of the past two decades can be explained 
in part at least by the traditional Soviet approach to security which 
emphasizes the ability of the Soviet Union (and earlier Tsarist Russia) to 
match or exceed the military capabilities of all potential opponents 
simultaneously However no matter bow one explains the rationale for the 
recent Soviet buildup, one factor is quite clear— the Soviets have gained a 
military advantage in Europe This advantage has political as well as
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military implications for the members of the Western alliance system The 
Soviets have demonstrated m  the past that they are well aware of the 
political advantages that can be gained from the possession of superior 
military power Some evidence exists that the growth of Soviet military power 
has had a degree of influence already on Western policies In 1975 for 
example, President Giscard d’Estaing of France stated that West European 
defense integration should not be pursued because of likely Soviet 
opposition 57 moreoever, Norway has pursued a policy of unilateral good will 
by excluding military installations from areas close to its border with the 
Soviet Union 58 Walter Laqueur has argued most strongly that Western Europe 
has already lost the will to defend itself and is on the verge of capitulating 
to the demands of the USSR 59
However much stronger evidence exists to argue that, despite the 
extension of Soviet military capabilities m  Europe, the Europeans are not in 
the process of giving m  to Soviet demands 60 Recent deployment of 
intermediate-range missiles m  Western Europe in the face of strong Soviet 
pressure, is but the most recent indication that the NATO alliance is not 
moribund
B The Economic Dimension of Soviet Policy in Europe
Although the Soviet Union has managed to establish overall military 
superiority m  Europe and has the military capabilities with which it can 
attempt to pursue some of its interests, the situation m  the economic area 
differs substantially Here as we have already noted above, the Soviets find 
that they are increasingly unable to compete effectively The Soviet economy 
continues to suffer from serious structural problems attempts to import
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Western technology have not proven to be the panacea that Brezhnev and Kosygin 
apparently hoped they would be when the Soviets expanded conmercial relations 
with the West at the beginning of the 1970s The Soviet Union m  the 
mid-1980s is still unable to sell much more than natural resources (especially 
energy), gold and military equipment on the world market It has been 
estimated for example that in 1981 these items comprised a full seventy-five 
percent of total hard-currency merchandise exports of the Soviet Union up 
from about sixty-five percent m  1977 61
Since Soviet economic relations have been discussed m  great detail by a 
substantial number of analysts m  both Western Europe and the United States 
our treatment of this topic here will be quite brief What is important to 
note as we have already pointed out above, is the fact that the Soviet 
economy continues to lag behind the Western economies One of the factors 
that induced the Soviets to pursue a policy of detente during the 1970s was 
the expectation that improved economic relations would enable them to import 
Western technology (and to gain the credits necessary to import that 
technology) as a means of solving some of their long-term economic problems 
Although they were successful in obtaining the credits and m  importing a much 
greater array of modern technology they have since discovered that their 
economic problems remain Moreover changes in the international political 
environment since the end of the 1970s have brought with them increased 
problems in expanding trade The efforts of both the Carter and Reagan 
Adminstrations to impose sanctions and to strengthen restrictions on trade 
with the USSR m  the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
imposition of martial law m  Poland have had a negative impact on the 
continued growth of Soviet trade with the West Moreover, the drop m  world
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prices of petroleum over the course of the past three or four years has cut 
into the Soviets' ability to cover the costs of imports
In addition to the economic goals that have motivated Soviet commercial 
relations with the West foreign trade is also meant to accomplish a number of 
important political goals As Angela Stent has noted the Soviets pursue at 
least three sets of political objectives m  their economic relations with 
Western Europe 62 The primary political objective is to continue to 
strengthen the West European commitment to detente and if possible to induce
the Europeans to be more accomodating toward the interests of the USSP_m
return for expanding export markets for Western Europe in the USSR A second 
probable objective emphasized by those who oppose the continued expansion of 
East-West trade, is the creation of Western economic dependence on the 
USSR— e g in the area of energy— which the Soviets might later be able to use 
to exert political pressures on Western Europe
A third objective relates to the long-term Soviet interest in dividing 
the Europeans from their IT S allies Since Fast-West trade has become far 
more important for the economies of Western Europe than it is for the United 
States, differences in perception have emerged m  Europe and the United States 
concerning the benefits of East-West trade and the rules under which such 
trade should take place In recent years the U S officials have taken a 
position that calls for greater restrictions on that trade while the West 
Europeans have emphasized the overall benefits that expanded trade with the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has brought 63 In the early years of the 
Reagan Administration divisions over Fast-West trade represented an important 
source of tension within the Western alliance system
Although trade with the Soviet Union has become important for most of the
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ma-|or countries in Western Europe, m  no case does the Soviet Union take more 
than a small percentage of the exports of a West European country Moreoever 
overall West European dependence on the USSR for energy supplies remains 
modest particularly among the maior NATO countries By 1990 only six percent 
of the primary energy requirements of France West Cermany and Italy will he 
met with Soviet sources 64 It must also be kept in mind that were the 
Soviets to attempt to use economic pressure against Europe would likely result 
in retaliation Although Soviet dependence on the West is not great enough to 
permit the latter to exert substantial pressures onthe USSR they would be 
able to have an important impact on the economies of the Soviets’ allies in 
Eastern Europe Given the poor state of the economies of most of the East 
European states and their substantial dependence on the West for spare parts 
semi-processed raw materials, and technology, it is likely that Western 
economic pressure would result m  serious economic deterioration Since the 
Soviets are already providing substantial subsidies to most of Eastern 
Europe,65 the result would be a maior increase m  the economic drain on the 
Soviet economy unless the Soviet leadership were willing to run the political
risks inherent m  permitting economic collapse in one or more East European 
countries
In sum, despite the fact that the USSR possesses the world’s second 
largest economy, the Soviet leadership has had little success m  using its 
economic potential for foreign policy purposes— in particular m  its relations 
with the industrial states of the West As we argued in some detail above, it 
is m  the economic dimension of the correlation of forces that the Soviets are 
the weakest At present there is little indication that they will be able to 
improve their position significantly in the near future Moreover they face
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serious probiens as they attenpt to pursue goals which, in part at least, 
appear to be nutually contradictory As they continue to build up their 
military capabilities they are likely to find that security concerns will 
increase m  both the United States and Western Europe These concerns, m  
turn will likely make it more difficult for then to continue to pursue 
policies aimed at expanding commercial relations with the industrialized 
West
C The Political Dimension of Soviet Policy in Europe
Actually many of the political goals of Soviet policy toward Western 
Europe have already been treated in our discussion of the military and 
economic dimensions of Soviet policy These include, most importantly the 
attempt to weaken the relationships between Western Europe and the United 
States A second, extremely significant, political goal of the USSR has been 
the desire to gam acceptance by the governments of Western Europe of its 
dominant position m  Eastern Europe To a substantial degree this goal was 
accomplished m  the first half of the 1970s with the signing a series of 
treaties culminating m  the Helsinki agreements, which provided Western 
recognition of the postwar boundaries in Central Europe and committed the 
West, m  particular West Germany, not to consider the use of force to change 
those boundaries
During the Polish Crisis of 1980-81 one of the manor charges leveled by 
the USSR concerned alledged Western interference in internal Polish affairs 
The Soviets, and their manor East European allies were strongly critical of 
Western monetary and political support for Solidarity They reiterated the
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point made most clearly at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in 1968, that change in the domestic political systems of the communist states 
of Europe would not be permitted 66 More recently strong Soviet pressure 
against the government of Erich Honecker of the CDR that resulted in his 
cancelling a scheduled visit to West Germany m  summer 1984 indicated that the 
Soviets are still concerned about the extension of West European relations 
with the smaller states of Eastern Europe and the possibility that such 
relations would lessen their own dominant position m  the region
In another area Soviet confidence about trends m  domestic political 
developments m  Western Europe appear to have waned during the course of the 
past decade In 1974-1975, after the establishment of democratic rule m  
Portugal and the rise of the Portuguese Communist Party as a powerful force m  
domestic politics, the Soviets attempted to play an active role in influencing 
the policies of the PCP 67 xhey called upon the Portuguese to learn the 
lessons inherent m  the recent overthrow of the government of Allende in 
Chile With the defeat of the communists m  Portugal, Soviet views for the 
likely success of revolutionary change m  Western Europe appear to have been 
tempered
However the CPSU was already facing a new challenge from Western Europe 
in the evolution of what came to be called Eurocommunism Both the Italian 
and the Spanish communist parties began publicly challenging the Soviets 
Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s they increasingly refused to accept 
Soviet ideological tutelage, criticized Soviet attempts to dominate Eastern 
Europe, and refused to accept the Soviet model as the only one appropriate for 
revolutionary change 68 Throughout the Polish crisis for example, both the 
Italian and Spanish communist parties blamed the situation on the pyramidal
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and totalitarian political organization of Soviet-style socialism and called 
for the immediate development of democracy and participation ^9 spring
1981 the Soviet and Italian parties were engaged in open polemics on the issue 
of Poland other West European communist parties lomed m  support of 
political reform within the Polish party and warned the Soviets against 
military intervention 70
Despite periodic Soviet statements concerning the coming crisis m  
capitalist societies, it is clear that they do not expect the West European 
communist parties, or other elements within the political left for that 
matter to have a major impact on developments in the near future Nor for 
that matter, can they any longer be sure that left-oriented political
l
movements are likely to perceive the Soviet Union as the model for the future 
To a very large extent the Soviets have lost the political advantages once 
thought to reside m  the existence of communist parties m  the West As 
Adomeit has noted The primary challenge of Eurocommunism is that posed to 
the legitimacy, validity and relevance of Soviet ideology and the Stoviet 
Union 71 The Soviets can no longer consider communist parties m  the West as 
automatic allies or as instruments of their own policy preferences
III Some Tentative Conclusions
What is evident from the foregoing discussion is the fact that the 
Soviets have managed to extend significantly their military capabilities in 
Europe and, thus, in this area of the correlation of forces they have 
strengthened their position relative to that of the West However their 
relative strength on other dimensions of the correlation has if anything, 
weakened over the course of the past decade They and their East European
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allies continue to suffer from serious economic problems— of systemic nature 
that far surpasses in long-term significance the current economic difficulties 
facing the countries of Western Europoe They can no longer rely on the 
support of West Furopean communist parties and are viewed as largely 
irrelevant to the concerns of other leftist political movements m  Europe In 
Europe, as m  virtually all other areas of the world, the Soviets find 
themselves in the position of what Paul Dibb has referred to as an incomplete 
superpower, which can rely only on military capabilities m  an attempt to 
gain important foreign policy and security goals ^  Yet even on the military 
dimension the Soviets currently face a new challenge— both m  Europe and 
globally— as the United States builds up its overall military capabilities and 
the members of NATO respond to the Soviet military challenge with the 
deployment of a new generation of nuclear weapons
Contrary to Soviet claims that history is on their side and that the 
correlation of forces is moving irrevocably in their favor, developments 
during the past decade have been, from a Soviet perspective, at best mixed 
NATO appears to be involved m  a process of renewal France under the 
socialist government of François Mitterand has cooperated with NATO more 
fully than at any time during the past twenty years As we have noted 
throughout this discussion domestic economic problems continue to plague the 
Soviet leaders Soviet influence among both reform and radical groups in the 
West has continued to weaken In other areas there is evidence that the 
Soviet position among the developing countries has also weakened, both as a 
result of the invasion of Afghanistan and of the inability of the Soviets to 
provide any effective solution to the problems of economic development facing
Third World governments
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This does not mean that the USSR no longer represents a serious challenge 
to Western interests The growth of Soviet military power in Europe and 
worldwide and the likelihood of an extended armaments race between the two 
superpowers do not present an environment that is conducive to peace and
security either m  Europe or on a global scale The members of the Western
I
alliance must continue with their efforts to develop an integrated approach to 
their relations with the Soviet Union— whether m  the military, the economic 
or the political realm If such cooperation can be established, and general 
long-term Western interests, rather than short-time gains for individual 
countries can become the basis for the foreign policies of the Western 
states then what the Soviets view as the inexorable chaJge m  the 
international balance in their favor can be reversed Such a development 
might help to induce a future Soviet leadership to recogJize that the state 
interests of the USSR will be better served by joining tbie international 
community of nations as an important actor and attempting to resolve its 
differences peacefully, rather than by continuing to be committed to radical 
change and the dissolution of the current international system
\
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